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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

TO:			ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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SUSPENSE 19 OCT 84						

D/Security: Please provide recommendation to DDCI and a coordinated reply for his signature.


Executive Secretory
17 October 1984

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



S-14,244/RSE-4

11 OCT 1984

The Honorable John N. McMahon Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

- 1. (S) I have reviewed your memorandum of 15 August 1984 concerning DESIST terminal access for DoD's Unified and Specified Commands (U&S) and find that it puts in serious jeopardy our efforts to support the U&S Commands with this important intelligence. Our differences on this issue are whether security considerations require that all terminal access to the DESIST computer be provided through dedicated communications lines or could an existing SI/TK system high computer network provide the necessary level of protection. Office of Security is advising you that dedicated terminal circuits are required; DIA's Office of Security and the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) System Engineering Office are advising me that dedicated circuits are not necessary since it is our understanding that the DESIST data base operates at the same security level as the Intelligence Data Handling System Communications-II Network. Therefore, I believe DCI minimum security requirements established in DCID 1/16 would not mandate use of dedicated terminal communications lines for this case.
- 2. (S) Further, within DoD the costs incurred by using dedicated communications circuits are prohibitive. For example, we estimate that for the eight U&S Commands to use dedicated circuits the annual cost would be \$500-650K. DIA and the Commands have not programmed funds to pay these costs; further, we cannot absorb them within existing resource levels. It is doubtful if senior DoD officials would approve dedicated circuits for DESIST terminals because military communications satellites are already over-subscribed and competition for available channels is intense.
- 3. (S) The impasse between our Agencies over the DESIST communications issue is of great concern to me. We must find some middle ground upon which a mutually acceptable compromise can be forged. My goal is a compromise that will satisfy CIA's security concerns about computer network operations and provide the U&S Commands early access to the DESIST data base. To achieve this goal, I recommend that our security and engineering staffs begin discussions immediately to resolve this issue.

Sincerely,

JAMES A. WILLIAMS

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Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

Director

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/RSE-4

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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